


**Public
Administration
Bulletin
Vietnam**



February 1, 1971

No. 55

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
I. Recent GVN Legislation	
Law 010/70 Limited parallel foreign exchange	1
Decree 116-SL/TC Implementation of Law 010/70	3
Decree 113-SL/NV Establish City of Qui Nhon	6
Decree 114-SL/NV Establish City of Mytho	8
Decree 115-SL/NV Establish City of Can Tho	10
Decree 132-SL/NV Establish City of Nha Trang	12
Decree 144-SL/NV Establish City of Rach Gia	14
Decree 118-SL/TC Civil Service Salaries and Allowances	16
Decree 119-SL/TC Civil Service Salaries and Allowances	19
Decree 915-ND Civil Service Salaries and Allowances	21
Decree 137-SL/GT/BD National Council of Telecommunications	25

Decree 153-SL/Th.T/QTCS Dissolution of Inter-Provincial Inspectors	27
Arrete 929-SL/NV Deputation of Authority	28
Arrete 010-SL/NV MOI Representatives	33
Mission Order 024-SVVT/Th.T/PC2/3 Foreign Aid Coordinating Committee	35
Circular 161-TT/Th/T/PC2 Concession of Lands to Military and Civil Servants	37
II. Cultural Receptivity to Induced Administrative Change A paper by Prof. Nguyen quoc Tri	43
III. Organization Charts	
Ministry of State	85
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	86
Ministry of the Interior	87
Ministry of Information	88
Ministry of Ethnic Development	89
Ministry of Open Arms	90
Ministry of Land Reform, Agriculture and Fishery Development	91
National Defense and Armed Forces of the RVN	92

P R E F A C E

The Public Administration Bulletin for Vietnam, published by the Public Administration Division, Agency for International Development, Saigon, Vietnam, attempts to report latest developments in the legislative, judicial, executive and autonomous branches of the Government of Vietnam, as well as other items of interest in the broad field of public administration. The Bulletin is published periodically with frequency of issues dependent upon the importance, urgency and volume of materials available. Readers are invited to comment, or to suggest timely materials which will contribute to the strengthening of Vietnamese administration and management at all levels of government.

To receive copies, or to submit contributions, write to the Editor, USAID/ADLD/PA, APO San Francisco 96243. Locally, copies of the Bulletin are available in Room 602, Lien Hoa Building, 275 Pham ngu Lao Street, Saigon, or by telephoning 93083 to 93090, Extension 4092.

LAW #010/70 establishing a limited parallel foreign exchange market.

Considering the Constitution of the Republic of Vietnam, dated April 1, 1967,

After debate and vote by the National Assembly,

THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

promulgates Law No. 010/70 of October 3, 1970 establishing a limited parallel foreign exchange market, the full text of which is as follows:

Art. 1 - There is hereby established, as supplement to the official foreign exchange market, a limited parallel foreign exchange market.

The official rate of the piaster remains unchanged.

The limited parallel foreign exchange market shall not apply to certain essential transactions, especially:

- a. Transfers for overseas students
- b. Transfers for the Government

Art. 2 - The necessary procedures for organization and administration of the limited parallel foreign exchange market mentioned in Article 1 shall be provided by decree.

Art. 3 - All prior provisions contrary to the present law shall be rescinded.

All previous provisions contrary to the decrees promulgated for implementing the present law shall be rescinded, effective the date these decrees are issued.

Art. 4 - The present law shall be promulgated according to emergency procedures and published in the Official Journal of the Republic of Vietnam.

Saigon, Oct. 3, 1970

s/ NGUYEN VAN THIEU

DECREE No. 116-SL/TC determining the procedures for the organization and administration of the limited parallel foreign exchange market.

THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE GOVERNMENT,

Considering the Constitution of the Republic of Vietnam dated April 1, 1967,

In view of Decree #394-TT/SL of September 1, 1969 determining the composition of the Government,

Considering Decree-Law No. 020-SLV of September 3, 1966, changing and amending Ordinance No. 48 of December 31, 1954 establishing the National Bank,

Considering Decree-Law No. 017-SLU of September 3, 1966, fixing the foreign exchange system,

Considering Law #010/70 of October 3, 1970 establishing a limited parallel foreign exchange market,

DECREES THE FOLLOWING:

Art. 1 - The present decree determines the procedures for the organization and administration of the "Limited parallel foreign exchange market" established by Law #010/70 of October 3, 1970.

Art. 2 - The limited parallel foreign exchange market is especially used for transactions in certain kinds of currencies.

Art. 3 - The limited parallel foreign exchange market shall enter into effect the fifth of October 1970, at 00 hours.

Art. 4 - Transactions and sales of foreign currencies at the limited parallel foreign exchange market are effected as follows:

Paragraph I: Sales of Foreign Currencies

The following transactions and sales of foreign currencies shall be made at the limited foreign exchange market.

- a. Transactions and sales of currencies belonging to private citizens and legal bodies, including the sale of currencies of Allied Forces for private use, - except for the transactions pertaining to:
 1. Sale of foreign currencies by official agencies of the Government of Vietnam
 2. Sale of foreign currencies by the Governments of foreign countries.
- b. All transactions for export-import.

Paragraph II: Purchase of foreign currencies

Transactions for purchasing the following foreign currencies shall be made at the limited parallel foreign exchange market.

- a. All transactions for transfer of money from Vietnam abroad, except:
 1. Transfer of money for overseas students,
 2. Transfer of money for the Government of Vietnam (such as expenditures for Vietnamese foreign affairs delegation, expenditures for missions abroad including training expenditures for civil servants, and military in foreign countries, etc.)

b. Import of goods determined by arretes of the Finance and Economy Inter-Ministries.

Art. 5 - The selling and purchase prices of foreign currencies at the limited parallel foreign exchange market shall be based on the rate of 275 piasters to the US dollar.

Art. 6 - Based on the selling and purchase prices mentioned in Art. 5, the National Bank shall determine the selling and purchase prices of other foreign currencies.

Art. 7 - The National Bank shall determine the selling and purchase prices of the foreign currencies with cash payment at the National Bank and other recognized banks.

The above prices shall not differ more than 1% from the prices mentioned in the above articles 5 and 6.

Art. 8 - The Ministers of Economy, of Finance, the Governor of the National Bank of Vietnam, are charged, each as to that which concerns him, with the execution of the present decree.

The present decree shall be promulgated according to the emergency procedures and published in the Official Journal of the Republic of Vietnam.

Saigon, October 3, 1970

s/ TRAN THIEN KHIEM

Prime Ministry
No. 113-SL/NV

THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE GOVERNMENT,

Considering the Constitution of the Republic of Vietnam,
dated April 1, 1967,

.....

Upon the recommendation of the Minister of the Interior,

DECREES THE FOLLOWING:

Art. 1 - The village of Qui Nhon, belonging to Tuy Phuoc district, Binh Dinh province and the neighboring territories are hereby transformed into City status.

Art. 2 - This city bears the name of "City of Qui Nhon", the territory of which comprises the Villages of Qui Nhon, Phuoc Hau, Phuoc Tan and Phuoc Hai.

Art. 3 - The city of Qui Nhon is divided into 2 districts, the boundaries of each are determined as follows:

1. Nhon Binh District

- Hai Cang, Dao duy Tu, Nguyen Du, Le Loi, Cuong De, Nguyen Hue, Ham Nghi, Xuan Quang and Ghenh Rang hamlets, Qui Nhon village.
- Phuoc Tan village.
- Hai Dong, Hai Nam, Hai Minh and Hai Giang hamlets - Phuoc Hai village.

2. Nhon Dinh District

- Phan boi Chau, Nguyen cong Tru, Ly thuong Kiet, Bach Dang, Huyen Tran and Thap Doi hamlets, Qui Nhon village.
- Phu Hoa, Phu Vinh, An Thanh, Van Ha, Nhon My, Tuong Van, Phu An, Binh Thanh, Luong Nong, Hung Thanh, Dong Dinh, Tay Dinh, Lac Truong, and Thuan Nghi hamlet, Phuoc Hau village.

The boundaries of the city of Qui Nhon and the districts of Nhon Binh and Nhon Dinh are determined in accordance with the map which is annexed to the original of the present decree.

Art. 4 - The city of Qui Nhon is under the supervision of a Mayor, assisted by one or more Deputy Mayors.

Art. 5 - The city of Qui Nhon shall have its own budget, this budget shall be established, approved and executed under the procedures applied to all city budgets.

Art. 6 - Expenditures for organizing the administrative structures of the city of Qui Nhon shall be borne by the National Budget.

Expenditures for organizing the administrative structures of the districts shall be borne by the city budget.

Art. 7 - The Vice Prime Minister, Ministers of State, Ministers, Secretaries of State, Vice Ministers and the Province Chief of Binh Dinh are charged, as far as their duties are concerned, with the execution of the present decree.

The present decree shall be published in the Official Journal of the Republic of Vietnam.

Saigon, September 30, 1970

s/ Tran thien Khlem

Prime Ministry
No. 114-SL/NV

THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE GOVERNMENT,

Considering the Constitution of the Republic of Vietnam,
dated April 1, 1967,

.....

Upon the recommendation of the Minister of the Interior,

DECREES THE FOLLOWING:

Art. 1 - The Village of Dieu Hoa, belonging to Chau Thanh district, Dinh Tuong province is hereby transformed into City status.

Art. 2 - This city bears the name of "City of My Tho". The city boundaries are determined in accordance with the map annexed to the original of the present decree.

Art. 3 - The city of My Tho is under the supervision of a Mayor, assisted by one or more Deputy Mayors.

Art. 4 - The city of My Tho shall have its own budget. This budget shall be established, approved and executed under the procedures applied to all city budgets.

Art. 5 - Expenditures for organizing the administrative structures of the city of My Tho shall be borne by the National Budget.

Art. 6 - The Vice Prime Minister, Ministers of State,

Ministers, Secretaries of State, Vice Ministers and the Province Chief of Dinh Tuong shall carry out the execution of the present decree, as far as their respective duties are concerned.

The present decree shall be published in the Official Journal of the Republic of Vietnam.

Saigon, Sept. 30, 1970

s/ TRAN THIEN KHIEM

Prime Ministry
No. 115-SL/NV

THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE GOVERNMENT

Considering the Constitution of the Republic of Vietnam,
dated April 1, 1967,

.....

Upon the recommendation of the Minister of the Interior,

DECREES THE FOLLOWING:

Art. 1 - The village of Tan An, belonging to Chau Thanh district, Phong Dinh province and the neighboring territories are hereby transformed into City status.

Art. 2 - This city bears the name of "City of Can Tho", the territory of which comprises:

- Tan An village
- Thuan Duc village
- Loi Nguyen hamlet, An Binh village
- Binh Nhut hamlet, Long Tuyen village

The boundaries of the City of Can Tho are determined in accordance with the map annexed to the original of the present decree.

Art. 3 - The City of Can Tho is under the supervision of a Mayor, assisted by one or more Deputy Mayors.

Art. 4 - The City of Can Tho shall have its own budget. This budget shall be established, approved and executed under the procedures applied to all city budgets.

Art. 5 - Expenditures for organizing the administrative structures of the city of Can Tho shall be borne by the National Budget.

Art. 6 - The Vice Prime Minister, Ministers of State, Ministers, Secretaries of State, Vice Ministers and the Province Chief of Phong Dinh shall carry out the execution of the present decree as far as their respective duties are concerned.

The present decree shall be published in the Official Journal of the Republic of Vietnam.

Saigon, September 30, 1970

s/ TRAN THIEN KHIEM

Prime Ministry
No. 132-SL/NV

THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE GOVERNMENT,

In view of the Constitution of the Republic of Vietnam,
dated April 1, 1967,

.....

Upon the recommendation of the Minister of Interior,

DECREES THE FOLLOWING:

Art. 1 - The Nha Trang East and Nha Trang West Villages, belonging to Vinh Xuong district, Khanh Hoa province with the neighboring territories are hereby transformed into City status.

Art. 2 - This city bears the name of "City of Nha Trang" and its territory comprises:

- Nha Trang East Village
- Nha Trang West Village
- Vinh Hai Village
- Vinh Phuoc Village
- Vinh Nguyen Village, including the archipelagoes of Hon Lon (Hon Tre), Hon Mot, Hon Mun, Hon Mieu, Hon Tam.
- Vinh Truong Village.
- A part of the territory of Vinh Hiep Village (Vinh Diem Ha Hamlet).
- A part of the territory of Vinh Ngoc Village (Ngoc Thao, Ngoc Hoi and Lu Cam Hamlets).
- A part of the territory of Vinh Thai Village (Phuoc Hai Hamlet).

Art. 3 - The City of Nha Trang is divided into two districts, the territory of each is determined as follows:

District One

1. Nha Trang East Village
2. Vinh Hai Village
3. Vinh Phuoc Village
4. Ngoc Thao, Ngoc Hoi, and Lu Cam Hamlets, from Vinh Ngoc Village
5. Vinh Diem Ha Hamlet, from Vinh Hiep Village.

District Two

1. Nha Trang West Village
2. Vinh Truong Village
3. Vinh Nguyen Village, including the archipelagoes of Hon Lon (Hon Tre), Hon Mot, Hon Mun, Hon Mieu, Hon Tam
4. Phuoc Hai Hamlet, from Vinh Thai Village.

The boundaries of the City of Nha Trang, District One and District Two, are fixed in accordance with the map annexed to the original of the present decree.

Art. 4 - The City of Nha Trang is under the jurisdiction of a Mayor, assisted by one or more Deputy Mayors.

Art. 5 - The City of Nha Trang shall have its own budget, the establishment, approval and execution of it shall be under the procedures applied to the budgets of the cities.

Art. 6 - Expenditures for organizing the administrative structures of the City shall be borne by the National Budget. Expenditures for organizing administrative structures of the districts shall be borne by the City Budget.

Art. 7 - The Vice Prime Minister, Ministers of State, Minister Secretaries of State, Vice-Ministers and the Province Chief of Khanh Hoa are charged, each as to that which concerns him, with the execution of the present decree.

The present decree shall be published in the Official Journal of the Republic of Vietnam.

Saigon, October 22, 1970

s/ TRAN THIEN KHIEM

Prime Ministry
No. 144-SL/NV

THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE GOVERNMENT,

In view of the Constitution of the Republic of Vietnam,
dated April 1, 1967,

.....

Upon the recommendation of the Minister of the Interior,

DECREES THE FOLLOWING:

Art. 1 - The villages of Vinh Thanh Van and An Hoa belonging to the Kien Thanh district, Kien Giang province are hereby transformed into City status.

Art. 2 - This city shall bear the name of "City of Rach Gia".

The city boundaries are determined in accordance with the map which is annexed to the original of the present decree.

Art. 3 - The city of Rach Gia is under the supervision of a Mayor, assisted by one or more Deputy mayors.

Art. 4 - The city of Rach Gia shall have its own budget. This budget shall be established, approved and executed according to the procedures applied to all city budgets.

Art. 5 - Expenditures for organizing the administrative structures of the city of Rach Gia shall be borne by the National Budget.

Art. 6 - The Vice Prime Minister, Ministers of State,

Ministers, Secretaries of State, Vice Ministers and the Province Chief of Kien Giang are charged, each as to that which concerns him, with the execution of the present decree.

The present decree shall be published in the Official Journal of the Republic of Vietnam.

Saigon, November 20, 1970

s/ TRAN THIEN KHIEM

Republic of Viet Nam
Prime Ministry
Decree # 118-SL/TC

THE PRIME MINISTER,

Considering the Constitution of the Republic of Vietnam dated 1 April 1967,

Considering the Decree #394-TT/SL dated 1 September 1969 determined the components of the Government,

Considering Ordinance #9 dated 14 July 1950 which was corrected by Ordinance #16 dated 1 June 1950 determining general regulations for civil servants,

Considering Decree #28-NV dated 8 May 1954 determining the minimum standard of living index and family allowance for civil servants,

Considering Decree #300-e/TTP dated 14 October 1964 increasing basic salaries by 10%,

Considering Decree #106-SL/KTTC dated 18 June 1966 regarding 20%, 25%, 30% temporary allowances,

Considering Decree #99-SL/KTTC dated 17 May 1967 concerning rice allowances,

Considering Decree #91-SL/ThT/PC.2 dated 23 August 1969 concerning a special allowance of 1,000VN\$,

Considering Decree #48-TTP dated 29 Jan. 1964 and #300-g/TTP dated 14 Oct. 1964 determining high cost of living areas and monthly high cost of living allowances,

Considering the recommendation of the Minister of Finance,

D E C R E E S

Art. 1 - From 1 October 1970, salaries and allowances of regular status personnel are corrected as follows:

1. The minimum standard of living mentioned in part A, item 29, determining general regulations for civil servants is increased to 1,750VN\$.
2. The high cost of living allowances mentioned in part B, article 29, determining general regulations for civil servants is now fixed as follows:

	Region I (Low living cost)	Region II (High living cost)
- Individual	3,000VN\$/month	3,300VN\$/month
- Wife	400VN\$/month	500VN\$/month
- Child	400VN\$/month	500VN\$/month

3. Family allowances which were mentioned in part C, article 29, determining general rules for civil servants, are fixed as follows:

- Wife	700VN\$/month
- Child	600VN\$/month

Art. 2 - From 1 October 1970, all previous articles contrary to this Decree are hereby rescinded, especially the articles in the following decrees:

- Decree #28-NV dated 8 May 1954 determining the minimum standard of living index and family allowance for civil servants,

- Decree #300-e/TTP dated 14 October 1964 increasing basic salaries by 10%,
- Decree #106-SL/KTTC dated 18 June 1966 concerning temporary 20%, 25% allowances,
- Decree #99-SL/KTTC dated 17 May 1967 concerning rice allowances,
- Decree #91-SL/ThT/PC.2 dated 23 August 1969 concerning special allowance of 1,000VN\$.

Art. 3 - Deputy for the Prime Minister, Ministers of State, Ministers, Vice Ministers, each in his sphere of responsibility, is charged to execute this Decree.

This Decree will be carried in the RVN Official Gazette.

Saigon, 3 October 1970

s/ Tran thien Khiem

Republic of Viet Nam
Prime Ministry
Decree # 119-SL/TC

THE PRIME MINISTER,

Considering the Constitution dated 1 April 1967,

Considering Decree #394-TT/SL dated 1 September 1969
determining the composition of the Government,

Considering Ordinance #9 dated 14 July 1950 determining
general regulations for civil servants,

Considering Decree #175-NV dated 23 May 1955 and other
documents fixing the salaries, positions, and allowances
in kind and in cash to government officials, especially
Decree #042-SL/ThT/CV dated 27 March 1969,

Considering the recommendation of the Minister of Finance,

D E C R E E S:

Art. 1 - From 1 October 1970, price of all existing
allowances in kind or cash (except family and high cost
of living allowances) to government officials, are increased
uniformly to 60% over the present rates.

However, any allowances which were increased by 25%, in
accordance with Decree #42-SL/ThT/CV dated 27 March 1969,
and increased by other documents are hereby:

- a. To be increased again in accordance with the supplementary
ratio to the maximum 60% rate increase after 27 March 1969.

- b. Not to be increased again if the increase is equal to or greater than the 60% rate increase after 27 March 1969.

Art. 2 - Deputy for the Prime Minister, Ministers of State, Ministers, Vice Ministers, each in his sphere of responsibility, are charged with execution of this Decree.

This decree will be carried in the RVN Official Gazette.

Saigon, 3 October 1970

s/ Tran thien Khiem

Republic of Viet Nam
Prime Ministry
Decree # 915-ND/TC

THE PRIME MINISTER,

Considering the Constitution dated 1 April 1967,

Considering Decree #394-TT/SL dated 1 September 1969
determining the components of the Government,

Considering Ordinance #9 dated 14 July 1950 which was
corrected by Ordinance #16 dated 1 June 1953 determining
common regulations for civil servants,

Considering Arrete #739-NV dated 25 June 1954 and subsequent
supplementary documents fixing rules for non-regular
personnel,

Considering Decision #2334-HDCV dated 19 September 1967
re-determining monthly basic salaries for class B daily
hire personnel,

Considering Decree #118-SL/TC dated 3 October 1970 re-
determining the minimum cost of living, high cost of living
allowances and family allowances for civil servants,

Considering the recommendation of the Minister of Finance,

ENACTS

Art. 1 - From 1 October 1970, monthly basic salaries of
daily hire personnel and assimilated class B and class C
daily hire personnel are re-determined as follows:

Class	B-1	B-2	B-3	C-1	C-2
Step 1	4,140	2,970	2,730	1,540	1,340
Step 2	4,500	3,210	2,970	1,660	1,460
Step 3	4,860	3,450	3,210	1,780	1,580
Step 4	5,220	3,690	3,450	1,900	1,700
Step 5	5,580	4,130	3,690	2,020	1,820
Step 6	6,040	4,470	4,040	2,260	2,060
Step 7	6,500	4,810	4,390	2,500	2,300
Step 8	6,960	5,180	4,740	2,740	2,540
Step 9	7,420	5,520	5,090	2,980	2,780
Step 10	7,880	5,860	5,440	3,220	3,020

Art. 2 - High cost of living allowances of daily hire personnel and assimilated daily hire personnel class B-1, B-2, B-3, C-1 and C-2 are re-determined as follows:

Person authorized benefit	Rates	
	Region I (low cost of living)	Region II (high cost of living)
- Individual	2,600VN\$00	2,900VN\$00
- Wife	300VN\$00	375VN\$00
- Child (unlimited)	300VN\$00	375VN\$00

Art. 3 - Family allowances for daily hire personnel and assimilated daily hire personnel class B-1, B-2, B-3, C-1 and C-2, equal to 75% family allowance of regular status personnel.

Art. 4 - Regular laborers class D-1 get paid 4,300VN\$ a month (30 days a month).

This salary will be adjusted to the rate paid government laborers as determined by the Ministry of Labor for workers in private companies.

Workers whose salaries are based on the above rates will receive pay increased of 100VN\$ per month for each two years seniority.

Art. 5 - Daily hire personnel class D-1 receive family allowances according to the following procedure:

Wife	600VN\$/a month
Child (no limit)	350VN\$/ a month

Art. 6 - Non-regular laborers are classified as class D-2.

These laborers get paid according to the days they work in a month. Pay will be based on not less than 25 days, although some months do not afford 25 actual working days.

Daily salary of class D-2 laborers is: 143VN\$.

This rate will also be adjusted in accordance with Art. 4, paragraph 2. Family allowance is calculated according to Art. 5 of this arrete.

Art. 7 - Contract personnel receive salaries, high cost of living allowance, and a family allowance, the same as that for regular status personnel of the equivalent grade not to include withholding 6% for retirement salaries.

Art. 8 - Contract hire personnel whose salaries are clearly delineated with cost of living and family allowances, receive salaries and allowances the same as that for civil servants

of the same grade or daily hire personnel of the same class and step in which they have been assimilated.

Personnel whose salaries are not divided into cost of living and family allowances will receive a 17% increase in the total contract hire salary currently received excluding allowances pertaining to position or technical qualification.

Art. 9 - Previous regulations contrary to this arrete are hereby rescinded.

Art. 10 - Deputy Prime Minister, Ministers of State, Ministers, Vice Minister, each in his sphere of responsibility, are charged with execution of this arrete.

This arrete will be carried in the RVN Official Gazette.

Saigon, 3 Oct. 1970

s/ Tran thien Khiem

Prime Ministry
No. 137-SL/GT/BD

THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE GOVERNMENT,

In view of the Constitution of the Republic of Vietnam,
dated April 1, 1967,

Considering Decree No. 394-TT/SL of September 1, 1967,
determining the composition of the Government,

Considering Decree No. 120-SL/GT/BD of September 25, 1969,
fixing the duties and responsibilities of the Minister for
Communications & Post,

DECREES THE FOLLOWING:

Art. 1 - Now is hereby established the National Council of
Telecommunications with the following composition:

- | | |
|--|-----------|
| - The Prime Minister of the Government | Chairman |
| - The Minister for Communications & Post | Secretary |
| | General |
| - The Minister for National Defense | Member |
| - The Minister for Information | Member |
| - The Secretary of State for Executive
Affairs at the P.M.'s office | Member |
| - The Vice Minister for the Interior | Member |

The Chairman may also invite Ministers of State, Ministers,
Secretaries of State, Vice Ministers and representatives of
interested agencies to give their opinions whenever deemed
necessary.

Art. 2 - The National Council of Telecommunications has the
following responsibilities:

- Planning policies on telecommunications, electronics,
- Making decisions on establishment and development of telecommunications networks,
- Follow up the implementation of national and international telecommunications and electronics regulations,
- Coordinating the national resources on telecommunications and electronics.

Art. 3 - The Permanent Secretariat of the National Council of Telecommunications will study all matters submitted to the Council, implement the decisions of the Council and perform all operations in detail.

The Permanent Secretariat is headed by the Minister for Communications & Post and composed of:

- | | |
|---|--------------------------|
| - The Defense Ministry Representative | Member |
| - The Information Ministry Representative | Member |
| - The Interior Ministry Representative | Member |
| - The Director General for Post | Chief of the Secretariat |

Art. 4 - The detailed organization and functions of the Permanent Secretariat shall be determined by the Minister for Communications & Post.

Art. 5 - The Minister for Communications & Post, the Minister for National Defense, the Minister for Information, the Secretary of State for Executive Affairs at the P.M.'s office and the Vice-Minister for the Interior are charged, each as to that which concerns him, with the execution of the present decree.

Saigon, November 8, 1970

s/ TRAN THIEN KHIEM

Republic of Vietnam
Prime Minister's Office
No. 153-SL/Th.T/QTCS

THE PRIME MINISTER

Enacts the following decree:

Art. 1 - The offices of the Inter-Provincial Inspectors shall be dissolved effective January 1st, 1971.

Art. 2 - All employees of the above offices shall revert to the Directorate General of Civil Service which will assign them to agencies short of staff, except those needed for the establishment of a liquidation team in each Inter-Provincial Inspector's office.

Art. 3 - The matter of offices, files, vehicles, materials and equipment shall be decided by the Prime Ministry, in pursuance with the recommendations of the liquidation team.

The liquidation team comprises an Inter-Provincial Inspector and 2 employees maximum.

Art. 4 - In order to fulfil his duty, the Inter-Provincial Inspector, in the capacity of Chief of Liquidation Team, may continue to receive his pay and allowances during a period of two months.

Art. 5 - The operating expenditures of the Liquidation Team shall be borne by the National Budget (Office of the Prime Minister).

Art. 6 - The Secretary of State, Secretary General at the Prime Ministry and Inter-Provincial Inspectors are charged, each as to that which concerns him, with the execution of the present decree.

Saigon, December 9, 1970

s/ TRAN THIEN KHIEM

Republic of Viet Nam
Prime Ministry

No. 929/SL-NV

THE PRIME MINISTER,

- Considering the Constitution of the Republic of Vietnam of 4/1/1967,
- Considering Decree No. 394-TT/SL dated 9/1/1969 fixing the composition of the government,
- Considering Ordinance No. 7-a dated 24 Oct. 1956 and Circulars No. 115-a/TTP/VP dated 24 Oct. 1956 and No. 001-a/PTT/VP dated 1 March 1968 dealing with reform of national administration,
- Considering Decree No. 74/TTP dated 23 March 1959 and subsequent decrees dealing with organization of Saigon city management and decree No. 229-NV dated 18 Dec. 1965 dealing with management of other cities,
- Upon the recommendation of the Minister of Interior,

ENACTS:

Art. 1 - Within the scope of their authority as specified by law and under their supervision and responsibility, the Mayor of Saigon, other mayors and province chiefs may depute their direct assistants (Secretary General and assistant mayor in Saigon, deputy mayors in other cities and deputy province chiefs in provinces) by written decision to handle and approve a number of problems of local interest.

Art. 2 - The following problems may be entrusted to those assistants:

A. Problems which require a decision

1. Personnel:

- Recruitment, change of employees' status, admission into career of non-career employees from class B2 downward.
- Assignment of employees to TDY (except district chiefs and chiefs of technical services).
- Transfer of employees within each province, conduct of in-service training courses, commendation, punishment, leave (except employees from class B1 upward).

2. Finance:

- Sign papers dealing with payment of salary to employees,
- Sign papers dealing with procurement of supplies not exceeding VN\$ 200,000,
- Sign paying-in orders,
- Inspect account books, and city, province or village funds,
- Inspect and supervise tax collection.

3. Economic affairs:

- Harmonize supply and distribution of commodities,
- Control warehouses and stocks, plan the amount of supplies,

- Control distribution of commodities,
- Handle problems related to price,
- Issue written authorization to carry out a trade, except for trades which must be restricted for security reasons or for maintenance of good morals,
- Control exercise of profession as doctor and pharmacist, and other public and private health activities,
- Issue permit for transportation of goods.

4. Administrative and security affairs

- Census of young men and establish their draft status,
- Census of reservists,
- Issuance of permit for assemblies, except assembly on political activities,
- Issuance of permit for theatrical and show performances,
- Transmittal of files requesting establishment of associations and trade unions to higher authorities, except political groups,
- Issuance of permit to put advertisement boards in streets, to post placards, except placards for political purposes,
- Chairman of the Housing Committee and determination of the rate of rental; chairman of the town planning and construction committee and issuance of permit of construction.

5. Social and cultural affairs

- Certifying statement on the income of each student's family so that he may apply for stipend,
- Inspect instruction system in schools.

B. Problems which require no decision

- Certifying true copies and signatures,
- Signing papers to remind subordinate agencies within the local area to implement an order from higher authorities or to request them to explain on the implementation of orders, tasks or programs,
- Signing papers to ask other agencies for opinions; taking necessary procedural steps to establish such files as used in inquiry for appropriation of properties, inspection of land to be cleared, concessions, administrative inquiry in a neighborhood before giving permit to start a noisy and obnoxious trade,
- Transmittal of files to higher authorities when no comment is required,
- Issuance of traveling orders and transportation slip to subordinates,
- Signing other administrative papers to be used as documents in support, such as statement on a government official's background, certificate of date of employment, or of departure from a post, statement on budget receipts, and expenditures, list of allocated funds,
- Certifying minutes of meeting, reports of facts, maps.

Items listed in A and B above are not restrictive.

Art. 3 - The mayor of Saigon, mayors and province chiefs may not entrust the following matters to their assistants:

- Administrative regulations,
- Political and territorial security problems,
- Public order problems within the police power of the mayor or the province chief,
- Decisions which give rise to expenditures exceeding VN\$ 200,000,
- Decisions on disciplinary action against elected bodies under the administrative surveillance of the office of the mayor or of the province chief or against members of these bodies,
- Disciplinary action against non-career employees from class B1 upward.

Art. 4 - Decisions on delegation of authority must be published in RVN official journal.

Art. 5 - Deputy Prime Minister, Ministers of State, Ministers, Secretaries of State, Deputy Ministers, Mayors and province chiefs are charged each as to that which concerns him with the execution of this decree.

This decree will be published in RVN official journal.

Saigon, 19 October 1970

s/ TRAN THIEN KHIEM

Republic of Viet Nam
Prime Ministry

No. 010-SL/NV

THE PRIME MINISTER,

Considering the Constitution of the Republic of Vietnam of 1 April 1967.

Considering Decree No. 394-TT/SL dated 1 September 1969 fixing the composition of the Government.

Considering Decree No. 19-SL/NV dated 22 Nov. 1967 fixing the function of the Minister of Interior,

Considering Ordinance No. 57-a dated 24 October 1956 and subsequent documents on organization of local administration,

Considering Decree No. 614-BTT/SL dated 1 July 1970 governing organization of military regions,

Considering Decree No. 155-SL/BDXD dated 9 November 1969 and subsequent documents on establishment of Pacification and Revolutionary Development Councils,

Considering Decree No. 84-SL/NV dated 13 July 1968 and subsequent documents on organization of MOI,

Considering Decree No. 175-NV dated 23 May 1955 and subsequent documents fixing function allowances and other allowances in cash and in kind for government officials holding managerial positions,

Upon recommendation of the Minister of Interior,

ENACTS:

Art. 1 - There is assigned to each Military Region a Ministry of Interior representative;

These officials are placed directly under the office of the Minister of Interior;

Art. 2 - Ministry of Interior representatives assigned to each Military Region assume the following duties:

1. Serve as liaison officer between MOI and the Military Region concerned and between the Military Region and province and city authorities therein on matters of security and local administration.
2. Report to the Minister of Interior on the local situation and make comments and appropriate recommendations.
3. Implement special instructions of the Minister of Interior, particularly on coordination of inter-provincial and inter-municipal administrative activities.
4. Serve as MOI representative on the Regional Pacification and Rural Development Council.

Art. 3 - A MOI representative for each Military Region will be appointed by arrete of the Minister of Interior and will be entitled to same salary and allowances, in kind and in cash, granted to the Director of a large Directorate.

Art. 4 - The Minister of Interior, the Minister of Defense and the Secretary of State at the office of the Prime Minister are charged each as to that which concerns him with the execution of this decree.

Saigon, Feb. 5, 1971

s/ TRAN THIEN KHIEM

MISSION ORDER

Considering Mission Order #154-SVL/Th.T/Pc2/3 of Nov. 11, 1970 appointing the Minister of State for Reconstruction and Development as Coordinator of Foreign Aid Programs,

Considering the needs of service, pending the establishment of a Foreign Aid Coordinating Committee,

Now is hereby established an Interministerial Coordinating Committee for Foreign Aid Assistance with the responsibility of coordinating all foreign aid programs, with the following components:

- | | |
|---|-----------|
| - Minister of State for Reconstruction and Development | Chairman |
| - Representative of the Foreign Affairs Ministry | Member |
| - Representative of the Economy Ministry | Member |
| - Representative of the Finance Ministry | Member |
| - Director General for Budget and Foreign Aid | Member |
| - Director General for Planning | Member |
| - An employee of the Office of the Minister of State for Reconstruction and Development | Secretary |

The Committee may invite to the meeting representatives of the Ministries which are in need of foreign assistance.

As for the principles and guidelines for use of foreign assistance resources, the Committee will submit its proposals for the approval of the Prime Minister.

Saigon, 16 Feb. 1971

s/ TRAN THIEN KHIEM
Prime Minister

Republic of Viet Nam
Office of the Prime Minister

Saigon, 21 Sept. 1970

No. 161-TT-Th/T/PC2

CIRCULAR

THE PRIME MINISTER

TO: The Vice Prime Minister concurrently
 Minister of Education
 Ministers without portfolio
 Ministers
 Secretaries of State
 Under Secretaries
 Mayor of Saigon
 Province Chiefs
 City Mayors

SUBJ.: Simplification of procedures for concession of
 state domain lands to soldiers and civil servants.

The current regulations regarding concession of state domain lands require a number of procedures to avoid abuses.

Soldiers and civil servants are now living under extremely difficult conditions with their fixed salaries, and are encountering administrative problems in their applications for concession of state domain lands for cultivation and livestock raising to help increasing their family budget.

In a policy to help the two afore-mentioned low income classes whose problems are being recognized by the government and whose activities can be followed up, I therefore decide to apply the following simplified measures for granting concession of domain lands to them.

I. SCOPE OF APPLICATION

These new simplified procedures shall apply to:

- a. Vietnamese civil servants, on active duty or retired, their widows and non-regular status personnel.
- b. Vietnamese servicemen, on active duty or retired, war veterans and widows. If applicants are female civil servants or a member of the Women Auxiliary Corps (W.A.C.), and whose husbands are active civil servants or members of the armed forces, then only one of the two is entitled to apply.

II. CONCEDING AUTHORITIES

The Province Chiefs are the local authorities for making decision on land concession upon completion of investigations carried out by the Provincial Concession Committee.

When his decision on land concession is made, the Province Chief will report to the Ministry of Land Reform, Agriculture and Fishery Development - Directorate General of Land Affairs.

III. COMPOSITION OF DOSSIER

1. Concession Application - to be submitted in two copies with following details:
 - The kind of plants to be grown and the concession-operator's address at the province concerned;

- That the concession-operator has not previously been granted any state-owned land of private use, and has not applied for concession of other domain land.
- 2. Sketch of the land applied for (with another sketch of the location at legend 1/100,000); the site must be drawn accurately to avoid any duplication; the four boundaries must also be clearly indicated.
- 3. Certification as civil servant or soldier furnished by the employer or military unit concerned.
- 4. Written authorization of the husband (if applicant is married), if applicant is a female civil servant or a member of the W.A.C., or a widow of a civil servant or soldier, a certificate of evidence issued by the agency or military unit which husband previously served must be produced, (to be submitted in duplicate).

The applying civil servant and soldier are exempted from:

- Citizenship certificate
- Certificate of financial resources
- Declaration of elected residence
- Program of land clearing and cultivation

IV. CONCESSION AREA

These special procedures will apply only for any concession area under or equal to 10 ha. Only concession under 10 ha is exceptional. Concession over 10 ha will be subject to regular procedures in force.

V. PROCEDURES FOR EXAMINING DOSSIER AND DISTRIBUTING LAND

- a. Upon receipt of the complete dossier as mentioned in paragraph III above, the Province Chief will give the applicant a receipt and record the application in the Provincial Concession Applications Register as stipulated in Article 15, paragraph III, Decree of November 4, 1928 for priority date.
- b. Within 15 days after receiving the application, the Province Chief convenes the Provincial Concession Committee (the composition of which has been set forth by Circular 12601/BCCDDCN/HCTC-3/TT of 26/12/68 of the former Ministry of Land Reform and Agriculture) for initiating a preliminary investigation on the domain characteristics of the land.
- c. If the committee proposes approval, the concerned application along with the sketch of the plot will be posted seven days later at:
 - the location of the land
 - the village office which the land belongs to
 - the Province Administrative Officefor a one-month period, during which complaints will be received. This publication as well as its closure date must be recorded.
- d. During the posting period, the applicant must trace out the boundaries of the plot and plant boundary markers.
- e. At the expiration date of the publication, the Province Chief will again convene the Province Concession Committee for a final investigation on the domain characteristics of the land, settle in place all contingent disputes and make recommendations.

If the P.C.C., upon its visit to the local area, finds out that the plot has not been traced out nor planted with boundary markers, the Province Chief may consider that the applicant has tacitly given up his application for concession. Under this special procedure, the applicant is exempted from supplying a regular map, and as a matter of fact, it saves him from a major expense. Therefore, planting boundary markers is an important deed which prevents abuses and confusions from happening eventually. In addition, when boundary markers are set, the contingent disputes will be more easily settled.

The presence of the applicant in the field is always required when the P.C.C. is doing both its preliminary and final investigations on the domain land because he has to sign the P.C.C.'s investigation report.

- f. Upon receiving the dossier and reports submitted by the P.C.C., the Province Chief will decide on the matter. He may either decide to grant the land or reject the application. A copy of the dossier will then be transmitted to the national level (Ministry of Land Reform, Agriculture and Fishery Development - Directorate General of Land Affairs) along with a copy of his decision for granting the land or a report on reasons of his rejection.

In addition to the papers described in paragraph III above, the dossier also includes:

- P.C.C. report on preliminary investigation, 1 copy
- Publication report, 1 copy
- Content of publication, 1 copy
- Report on the closure of the publication, 1 copy
- P.C.C. report on final investigation, 1 copy
- Granting decision, 1 copy, or report on rejection reasons, 1 copy.

- g. Land distributed accordingly to procedures mentioned

above is for a temporary period of two years after the distribution date--or prior to that period, if there was an application for temporary concession. The Province Chief will send the P.C.C. to the site for examining the cultivation situation.

Based on the condition of land exploitation, the Province Chief will decide whether a concession can definitely be granted or extended for a temporary period, or withdrawn to the state domain land as indicated in Art. 26, Decree dated 4/11/1928.

VI. TRANSFERS-LEASES

All transfers or leases of domain lands without permission under temporary concession or even definitive concession within ten years are strictly forbidden. All infractions to that provision will lead to unconditional withdrawal without compensation of the subject land to the state domain.

s/TRAN THIEN KHIEM

CULTURAL RECEPTIVITY TO INDUCED ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGE

- THE CASE OF VIETNAM -

**A Test of An Anthropological Framework
For Cross-Cultural Transfer of Administrative Features**

**Prepared for the Joint Meeting of the SEADAG
Development Administration and Political Development Panels
Held in HongKong from
January 18 to January 21, 1971**

**by
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Professor,
National Institute of Administration
Saigon, Vietnam**

This paper is adapted from the author's unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, "Culture and Technical Assistance in Public Administration: A Study of What Can be Transferred from the United States to Vietnam." University of Southern California, Los Angeles, January 1970.

INTRODUCTION

What can or cannot be transferred from one country to another in the field of public administration?

In attempting to identify phenomena which help in finding an answer to this question, this study hypothesizes that there is no general formula for the cross-cultural transfer of administrative features.

The problem embodied in this hypothesis appears to be one of the basic issues in international technical cooperation. Theories of development administration as well as experiences in technical assistance do not seem to provide any clear-cut answers to the question. On the one hand, there has been a great deal of controversy about whether or not public administration, or at least some part of it, can claim to be a science whose rules can be applied equally successfully everywhere. On the other hand, transnational inducements of administrative reforms through technical assistance have brought about very dissimilar results. What is likely to have succeeded here appears to have failed elsewhere so that it is impossible to know which items are transferable because of the wide gap between developed and developing countries appears to have been denied by practice since at least some American administrative features have been applied very successfully in various countries, as it was the case with the introduction of the system of executive budget and electro mechanic accounting to South Vietnam.

On the other hand, the "optimists" who believe that administration

is a universal science, with principles, techniques or processes applicable anywhere regardless of environmental conditions have found their approach confirmed only in a few cases, but not in all.

Equally doubtful is Weidner's suggestion that the transfer of administrative features should take place only at the stage of experimentation when the recipient country is development oriented.¹ However, experience in technical assistance has demonstrated that the introduction of administrative innovations has not necessarily led to good results at this stage or to failures at the state of take-over when the objectives of government is directed toward making power secure.

Finally, an authority on technical assistance in public administration, Ralph Braibanti, perhaps tired with theorizing, concludes that cohesive doctrine is of much less value than the pragmatic "muddle through".²

The issue is all the more complex since the transfer of administrative items is not only difficult from developed to undeveloped nations but also among advanced Western countries. Indeed, proposals by U.S. reform commissions for the adoption of the British Administrative Class under the label of Senior Civil Service have aroused little interest among Congressmen and professional association, and have so far not materialized. Similarly, many writers have expressed their doubts as to the applicability in the United States of the Scandinavian Ombudsman because this country does not possess the cultural factors required for its adoption.

In short, technical assistance achievements as well as cases of administrative reforms in developed nations seem to have disproved all attempts at generalizations about what can be transferred cross-culturally. For one thing, there appears to be no universal applicability of administrative practice. For another thing, cultural barriers are not likely to create unsurmountable obstacles in all cases.

The conclusion that may derive is that there is no theory which can be formulated on an a priori basis for the question. On the one hand, one should admit that each public administration system, as part of a culture which is unique in itself, must be also unique in its kind. Bureaucratic behavior is not only influenced by technological requirements but also and to a large extent, by the prevailing cultural values, attitudes and beliefs. As long as we have not dealt with the difference in human behavior between cultures, public administration cannot claim to be a science. On the other hand, it should be recognized that every culture does change by borrowing from many other cultures. But once imported, the borrowed elements no longer remain the same because they interact with other existing elements in the recipient culture to form new combinations, new syntheses. In other words, what is important is not the part itself but its relationships with other parts and with the whole. Thus, though there may exist common elements among cultures, each culture remains distinct and has its own way of changing depending upon how it combines the homegrown and the imported items into an integrated whole.

This suggests that the answer to our question of cross-cultural transfer of administrative practice has to be dealt with on a case-by-case basis by studying both the culture which exports and that which imports the administrative features.

This first chapter of this paper will be devoted to the exposition of the proposed paradigm for cross-cultural transfer of administrative features, and the second chapter will test this framework against the transferability of American administrative systems and techniques to the Vietnamese setting.

Chapter I

The Proposed Framework

If one follows cultural anthropologists to assume that each culture is distinct in itself and has its own way of changing

by selectively incorporating new elements from other cultures, one is likely to find a way to explain why some implanted administrative features fared well in one country but not in another, or why among several items from one exporting country only some were introduced successfully in one recipient country.

How culture change

The following cases of cultural change, among others, may illustrate the point.

As reported by Peter Farb, the Cheyenne Indians practiced agriculture before the arrival of the white man. The introduction of the horse by the Spaniards led to a new combination of their culture. With horses, the Cheyenne began to exploit the abundance of bison and thus changed the base of their economy from agriculture to hunting. This resulted in new styles of dress, ornaments, and social stratification based on horse ownership in a society which had previously been egalitarian. The horse was precisely the new cultural element that changed the whole way of life of this people. But let us not forget the fact - and this fact is crucial, that the Cheyenne society possessed some peculiar features that permitted it to accept the Spanish horse but not other elements from the Spanish culture and integrated it into its culture. In fact they had hunted bison as a secondary activity to farming but had not had the technical element, the horse, to expand this activity. The Paiute of the Great Basins also obtained horses from the Spaniards, but instead of using them for bison hunting, they simply ate them and no such broad cultural change followed.³

Another example reported by Goodenough shows how the introduction of a new fishing method changed the social structure of the Onotoans, a people in one of the Southern Gilbert Islands in the Pacific. This community which had been made up of extended families tied up together by the Kaainga - group of people descended from a common ancestor, was transformed into one based on isolated individuals united by Mwaneaba - the common meeting house of the entire community.

The Onotoans had used big boats for fishing close to shore. This traditional method involved a network of cooperative relationships based on the extended family system. At the beginning of the twentieth century, local people were able to buy the wood with which to construct canoes that permitted deep sea fishing. Because this new method required only two persons for each canoe, it finally broke up the cooperatives based on the extended family, the family system itself, and the social institution of Kaainga. Using a materialistic explanation, one is tempted to admit that it was the introduction of a new technological tool - the canoe which determined the change in social institutions. But if one goes a step further, one will find that it was not so simple. Deep-sea fishing by canoes had existed concurrently with the traditional method. The possession of the outrigger sailing canoe was considered by the local people as a symbol of prestige, and open-sea varieties of fish caught by this method of fishing by canoe were rated as highly desirable food. Though local people valued the canoes, very few could afford to get them. Such was the situation when the British colonizers hired the Onotoans to work on the mines in a neighboring island. At the expiration of the contract, workers returned to their island and instead of spending their savings for other things, used them to buy wood to construct canoes for deep-sea fishing. In the beginning only two persons had owned canoes; fifty years later, in 1951, two-thirds of the population possessed canoes, and this resulted in the transformation of their social structure. It should be emphasized that the same canoe was not incorporated by people in neighboring islands and did not produce any such societal change.⁴

The peculiar way in which each society incorporates new elements into its total culture makes it necessary to study the culture of a country to know its people's way of life, what makes them like this but not that, why they solve their problems this way and not that way, in the hope of predicting how they are likely to react to innovations.

How the Public Administration Systems Incorporate New Elements

In the field of public administration, the transferred elements are usually instruments desired specifically to solve problems in the exporting culture in a manner conforming to the total way of life of the people in this culture. Thus, there is also the need to study the culture of the exporting country to identify the purpose served by the administrative feature used there in addition to the function this technique is likely to fulfill in the importing culture. The American executive budget system which serves the cause of efficiency through central coordination and leadership in the U.S. has been transplanted so successfully in South Vietnam, because it has helped strengthen the Vietnam values of social hierarchy and executive leadership.

On the other hand, attempts at introducing the American position classification system into the Vietnamese Civil Service which began in the late 1956's have so far not materialized. This system based on the principle of "equal pay for equal work", "rank in the job not in the man", which is the product of an egalitarian society, has not been accepted in a South East Asian country where the preference for social hierarchy, inherent rank and status still pervades the whole society and its bureaucracy.

The Predominant Role of the Value System

In order to know the role each administrative feature is likely to perform in each culture, one may refer to what anthropologists call the value system which is assumed to govern human behavior in almost every sphere of life. In a certain respect, this value system which is made up of the fundamental relationships found in a culture, may be viewed as the basic logic of the whole society. Since the parts of a whole cannot run counter to this logic, the transferred administrative items appear to be incorporated into the importing culture only when they can fit into its value system.

Hall's Major Triad ⁵

The anthropologist Edward T. Hall's distinction between the formal, informal and technical part of the value system seems to be crucial for an understanding of the goodness of fit of imported administrative features because of the different degree of permeability of each part.

Formal behavior is learned by following precepts and admonitions of a yes - no, right - wrong character, language is mostly transmitted this way through generations. The characteristic of the formal system is that it exists at the deepest level of subconsciousness and is thus completely taken for granted. Indeed, an American rarely questions why he says "went" instead of "goed", why he does not marry the daughter of his father's brother.

Informal behavior is mainly learned by taking cues from others as models and is usually less rigid than formal behavior. Sex is mostly learned that way. The same can be said of the rules for social interaction. You just unconsciously imitate the way people greet, address, talk to each other. Intuitively, you call someone by his first name or his position title, you maintain proper conversation distance, but you cannot give any clear-cut rules for these informal manners.

Technical learning is on the contrary, mostly transmitted in explicit terms like from teacher to students. Unlike formal and informal learning, technical learning is fully conscious behavior which happens at the highest level of awareness.

Formal and informal norms of behavior are at times so identified with nature itself that their violations are thought of as impossible and provoke strong emotional reactions, anxiety, or are characterized by a suppression of feeling. For this reason, formal and informal systems are highly resistant to change. On the contrary, technical behavior which exists at the level of consciousness, is under the control of man and thus can be subject to change. In other words, the technical level may be considered as culturally neutral.

In actuality, the boundary dividing the formal, informal and technical systems sometimes becomes very blurred because the systems exist in a relationship of continuous change, shifting one into the other. What is treated as formal at one time may later become informal and then technical. Technical activity also tends to turn into informal and formal ones.

In the American culture, premarital chastity used to be a formal behavior pattern supported by technical props such as manner of dressing, close chaperonage, and limited times and places where young ladies could be seen with a man. With the gradual disappearance of these traditional restraints, the formal virtue has turned toward being treated technically, and unlike people in other cultures, Americans have come to hold the view that the controls exist in the person and not in the situation.

On the other hand, science which is the very essence of the technical, actually is supported by a large number of formal systems which nobody questions, such as the methodology of science, the objectivity of the scientists and their professional honesty. There are procedural rituals in any science that students must learn and later pass on to their own disciples. In the behavioral science, there already develops a tendency to measure the degree to which a paper is "scientific" by the proportion of text to footnotes and the quantity of statistics in relation to text. This is the way methodological rules become formalized, although some times there may be nothing scientific in them.

The Hypothetical Framework

In the light of what has been said, the following framework for cross cultural transfer of administrative items is proposed:

The theory, well known in cultural anthropology that each culture is a systematic and integrated whole whose parts are linked together by a central value system will serve as a basic premise for the solution of our problem.

In order to know the function fulfilled by a transferred item in the exporting as well as the importing culture, the value system of each should be studied.

What can be transferred from the exporting country to the importing country is assumed to depend upon whether or not the administrative item devised to solve problems in the exporting culture in accordance with its value system can fit into the value system of the importing culture.

This goodness of fit may take three forms:

- (1) Those borrowed features which tend to reinforce the prevailing values of the recipient country would be most acceptable;
- (2) Those that change only the technical part of local behavior would also be easily incorporated;
- (3) Those that run counter to the formal and informal behavioral systems of the importing culture are most likely to be turned down either by outright rejection at the outset, by gradual disappearance or by increasing the degree of formalism, i.e. of gap between the expected and the achieved.

For the purpose of illustration, the transferability of American administrative systems and techniques to South Vietnam will be studied in the following chapter in the light of the framework.

Chapter II

What Can Be Transferred from The United States to South Viet Nam?

In accordance with the advanced paradigm, the American and Vietnamese value system and their impact upon the different

behavioral spheres of the two peoples will be dealt with in a first part; and various public administration technical assistance projects will be studied in a second part to support the hypothesis as to what can be transferred between the two countries.

Part 1

Value and Behavior in America and Viet Nam

The value system of any culture is assumed to be made up of specific values centering around focal values which, in turn, stem from the value orientations, as suggested by the anthropologist Cora DuBois. It is implied in this assumption that "no system of values can encompass genuine contraries "and" in any value system where such spurious oppositions exist there will be a strain for consistency."⁶

American and Vietnamese Value Orientations

Value orientations are defined summarily by Florence Kluckhohn and Fred Strodtbeck as generalized and organized principles concerning basic human problems which pervasively and profoundly influence man's behavior, including: (1) human nature orientation; (2) man - nature orientation; (3) time orientation; (4) space orientation; (5) activity orientation; and (6) relational orientation.⁷ Vietnamese and Americans seem to differ greatly in their orientations to these basic problems.

Human Nature

According to most anthropologists, the American orientation inherited from Puritan ancestors is that of a basically evil but perfectible human nature. Thus, Americans tend to believe,

as F. Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck put it, that "constant control and discipline of the self are required if any goodness is to be achieved".⁸

On the other hand, the Vietnamese, under the prevailing influence of Confucianism, have been led to hold the view that man is inherently good but corruptible. So, he must strive to keep his goodness by constantly self-examining in order to improve his moral self.⁹

Americans and Vietnamese appear also to have different conceptions with respect to the relation of man to nature and supernature.

Man-Nature

According to social scientists, cultures tend to hold three main conceptions about this relationship - subjugation to nature, harmony with nature, and mastery over nature. Americans tend to believe that man can control nature which is but a kind of machine - hence the emphasis on technology,¹⁰ whereas Vietnamese are inclined to think that there is complete harmony between man and nature and supernature which are but part of a same whole - hence the strong faith placed upon the scholars' exemplary life, and astrology, horoscope as a means of conforming to nature.¹¹

Time and Space

Besides the view of nature, every culture must have their conceptions of the past, the present, and the future. While American culture puts a heavy weight on the future which is anticipated to be "better" and "bigger"¹², Vietnamese appear to be more attached to the past.¹³

People who are oriented to the future tend to stress movement

and mobility, and in this respect no peoples in the world can compare with the Americans.¹⁴ Whereas dynamism is a key aspect of the American culture, attachment to the ancestors' land and to the primary groups has been a predominant feature of the Vietnamese society.¹⁵

Activity

Americans and Vietnamese tend also to differ sharply on their activity orientation. Anthropologists have classified this orientation along a threefold range of variation in solution - "being," "being-in-becoming," and "doing". The "being" orientation is the tendency to act spontaneously to satisfy one's impulses and desires. The "being-in-becoming" orientation is the preference for activities which develop all aspects of the self as an integrated whole. Unlike the "being" orientation, it stresses the control and containment of impulses by means of mediation and detachment - while the "being" and "being-in-becoming" orientations are both concerned with what the human actor is rather than what he can accomplish, the "doing" orientation emphasizes the accomplishment itself and prefers the "kind of activity which results in accomplishments that are measurably by standard conceived to be external to the acting individual." These three orientations are roughly equivalent to the commonly known "Dioysan," "Apollonian," and "Promethean" tendencies.¹⁶

According to anthropologist, the "doing" orientation is characteristically the dominant one in the American society as expressed in such stock phrases as, "getting things done", and "let's do something about it."¹⁷

The "being-in-becoming" tendency appears to be the characteristic of the Vietnamese, as reflected in the Confucian "Golden Mean" and the Buddhist "Middle Path" as well as in popular wisdom which urge self-control, meditation and caution in one's act.¹⁸

Relational Orientation

This orientation about man's relation to other men has been subdivided by anthropologists into the categories - lineal, collateral, and individualistic - while all three variations exist in every society, in individualistic - oriented cultures, the autonomy of the individual is predominant, individual goals prevailing over those of collateral or lineal groups. When collaterality is predominant, the individual is not a human being except as he is a part of a social order, a laterally extended group, like the extended family, whose goals and welfare are prevalent. If the lineal principle dominates the "relational" system, group goals again prevail over those of the individuals, but one of the most important of these group goals is the "continuity of the group through time and ordered positional succession within the group."¹⁹

The principle of lineality has governed the Vietnam extended family which is but a variation of the Chinese "clan", and is manifested in such institutions as the common house for ancestors' worship, common graveyard, solidary responsibility, mutual help, authority of the elders.²⁰ As far as American culture is concerned, few would deny that it is government by the principle of individual autonomy.

From these six value orientations serving as basic premises, one can drive the focal and specific values which prevail in America and Vietnam.

American Focal and Specific Values

The following four focal values may thus be identified in the American culture "effort-optimism", "material well-being", "conformity," and "self-reliance." Since there is mutual interaction and reinforcement among the basic premises to produce these central values, it cannot be categorically assumed that each value derives from each specific value

orientation, but only that some value may be the direct consequence of some orientation more than of others. For example, effort optimism derives mainly from the belief of man's perfectibility; material well-being from the premise that man is master of a mechanical universe; self-reliance from the individualistic orientation; conformity from the premise of man's equality which appears to be the consequence of the combination of the conceptions of man's perfectibility and individual autonomy leading to the belief that all individuals are equally perfectible through their own efforts.

It should be noted, in addition, that these focal values also exist in a state of mutual dependence, and the relationship between each of them and their supposedly derivative values should be understood in similar manners.

Effort-Optimism

The belief that man is inherently bad but perfectible induces Americans to make an effort to perfect themselves. This endeavor makes work a specific value in the Yankee culture. This belief that "hard work is rewarding" is reinforced by an extraordinary sense of optimism. Even when faced with unsurmountable obstacles, Americans still believe that "something can be done about it."

The theme of "effort-optimism" appears also to be at the root of the cult of progress, the extraordinary desire for change and the cult of youthfulness.

Material Well-Being

If the universe is conceived as a kind of machine that man can subdue and exploit for his use through his hard work, material comfort appears to Americans as a reward for achievement, a "right" due to those who have conscientiously practiced the value of work.

This seems to be consistent with the American love of bigness, the specialization or atomization of knowledge, the high place accorded to efficiency and practicality, and the strong faith in science and secular rationality.

Self-Reliance

If individual goals are given primacy, the individual must rely mainly upon himself to achieve these goals and can expect to be rewarded after working hard.

For this reason, personal achievement is particularly emphasized in the American culture. Individual competition, social mobility, and equality of opportunity seem to have reached a degree unequalled anywhere.

Conformity

Equality and achievement maximize competition and result in an amorphous social structure in which individuals are uncertain about their social position. Conformity to the standard of the current majority is a way to solve this status of uncertainty.

This focal value may be used in conjunction with others to explain many aspects of the American character such as the so called "cult of the average man," the devotion to the "underdog," the easy but casual friendship, the extraordinary readiness to join with the anonymous other in voluntary associations, the belief in team work, persuasion, permissiveness rather than authority, and hierarchy as principles of organization, the "missionary spirit" or determination to help others by making the world over on the American model.

Vietnamese Focal and Specific Values

From the basic value orientations already mentioned, the following focal values are derived for the Vietnamese culture: self-control, harmony with non-self, social hierarchy, and mutual dependence.

Self-Control

The belief that man is born good but corruptible and the being-in-becoming orientation seem to be the source of the constant concern of the Vietnamese to self-examine, to master himself so as to maintain his inherent goodness, to improve his moral self. This is likely to be the reason why most of the personal virtues are based on the control of the self-moderation, patience, modesty, caution, equanimity, moral probity, resignation, discipline.

This preoccupation with maintaining the internal equilibrium of the inner self goes along with a constant concern for achieving harmony between the self and the environment.

Harmony with the Non-Self

This harmony is manifested in the relationship with nature and with other men. Harmony with the universe is assumed to be realized when man conforms to the existing natural order about him. Thus, this harmonious world order should not be troubled by a too tall building or a too straight street. There are "good" as well as "bad" days for engaging in any kind of activity. Even the sovereign must not trouble world harmony. Any wrong deed on his part may bring about catastrophes for the country.

Harmony should also be maintained in social relationship. The general code of conduct here is to seek the equilibrium by following the "Just Middle", and "Not to fall into the extremes". Besides the virtues already mentioned, the following qualities are required for the maintenance of this just

middle - avoidance of injury to others, concern for not hurting individual susceptibility, compromise, politeness, delicacy, tactfulness, gentleness, suppleness, flexibility.

As a result of this concern for harmony, a high premium is placed on the status quo, and change tends to be considered as disrupting the existing harmonious order of things. This present order is also one in which the rights and duties of everyone are clearly defined according to his position in the social hierarchy.

Social Hierarchy

In the Vietnamese view, hierarchy but not equality is the natural order of everything in the universe. Since inequality is the law of nature, to live in harmony with nature is to conform to his hierarchical system, to know one's position in it and to behave accordingly. Thus, the society is based on a clear hierarchy of statuses which in turn is supported by a body of formal rules governing the relationship between people at the higher and lower levels. These formal conventions must be adhered to by everyone depending upon his position in the hierarchy making conformity a necessary virtue.

Accordingly from hierarchy as a focal value, one can derive specific values such as concern for status, emphasis on ceremonial conventions, and conformity to rituals and etiquettes.

Mutual Dependence

These are in turn reinforced by a clearly delineated network of mutual dependence resulting from the principle of lineality. Solidarity and reciprocity are thus the cornerstone of relationships between members of the family and larger social groups.

Mutual dependence is reflected in filial piety as a cardinal

virtue in family life, and in fidelity to the person of the sovereign as a highly praised quality in public life.

Some Value Change in Vietnam

What has been said are supposed to be the ideal features of the Vietnamese traditional culture. As Vietnam has been in contact with Western civilization for about a century now, Vietnamese have indeed internalized a great many features of new values. But this seems to be only a one-sided internalization or a change in form rather than in substance. There is indeed no "poverty of wants" especially among the Westernized elements in Vietnam. There is instead an omnipresent desire for Western assets.

The value of material welfare does not await foreign pressure to be adopted. But whereas American material well-being is a way to fulfill the need for prestige, a reward for hard work, what has been transferred to Vietnam becomes merely virtuous materialism. This import of materialism without its concomitant feature of hard work does not appear to lead to more economic development but rather more corruption, more black market.

A people who have been subject to rigid social conformity are also very quick to adopt the value of equality. But here again, the imported equality seems to have lost its ideal feature. Those who want to be equal with their superior, tend to ask for an equality in rights and privileges, but not in responsibility. Since everybody wants to be boss, nobody wants to be commanded. Participative management thus tends to become a means to avoid responsibility, to put off rough decisions, rather than to provide more light and intelligence to the decision-making process.

"Fed up" with his poor relative who keeps asking for help, money and favor of all kinds, the Vietnamese is also very quick to become individualistic. But this self-isolation

does not go along with a readiness to join with the anonymous others in solving problems of communal and national interests. Self-reliance has virtually become egoistic individualism. The "individualist" Vietnamese no longer cares for anything except his own personal interest. He is thus apt to pack up and quit his country at war, and to search for a place where he can alone enjoy material welfare, equality and individual freedom.

Value and Behavior

The above mentioned value patterns appear to pervade every sphere of life of the American and Vietnamese people, strongly influencing the way they fulfill their needs of sociability, security, and status. Their impact has been clearly revealed in the way the two peoples organize themselves into groups and in the kind of activity they prefer to pursue. Vietnamese tend to satisfy their social needs within the status-based clans, making the latter the strongest group in the society, overshadowing all others. Americans are more inclined to rely on the contract-based clubs or associations to satisfy the same needs. They also tend to prefer economic activities whereas Vietnamese give primacy to moral and intellectual activities.

The difference in value configurations between Americans and Vietnamese have also led to a great divergence in their respective views of bureaucracy, its role and its relationships with other systems as well as its internal organization. American emphasis on economics has resulted in a relatively low status bureaucracy whose role has been minimized and reduced to that of servant of the people and of the economy. Effectiveness and responsiveness are two main criteria for evaluating bureaucratic performance.

Vietnamese, in contrast, conceive of bureaucracy as a body of elites serving as guides and educators for the common people because of their moral and intellectual capacity.

In its interaction with the private sector, American Public Administration has been strongly influenced by the values of the market, as shown by its emphasis on cost-effectiveness and practical results. Vietnamese concern for social harmony has made for the predominance of the scholar bureaucrats over the businessmen. The relationships between American bureaucracy and the social structure has been mediated by the associations which exert pressure upon, as well as provide support to, public agency. Vietnamese bureaucracy has been a traditional place for the clans to enhance their prestige, status, and privileges by contributing their eminent members to the service of the state. This difference in relationship between public administration and social groups has led to differences in bureaucratic problems such as nepotism, regional animosity in Vietnam; empire-building and sale of influence in America.

The absence of class resulting from American equalitarianism has been reflected in the representativeness of American bureaucracy and the predominant role played by the specialist. The traditional division of the hierarchical Vietnamese society into four classes - scholar, farmer, craftsman, merchant - has resulted in the concentration of the elite in the bureaucracy, the separation of bureaucrats as a ruling class, and the segmentation of public employees into isolated strata.

American equalitarianism has led to the sovereignty of the people and the superiority of politicians over bureaucrats, no matter how expert the latter may be. The Vietnamese view that authority derives from the top has made the bureaucracy all powerful vis-a-vis all other groups, political or otherwise. In practice, Vietnamese bureaucracy has become an arena for political struggle. To keep bureaucrats responsive to the will of the people, bureaucratic weakness has been institutionalized in America by its spectacular fragmentation. In contrast, the strength and superiority of Vietnamese bureaucracy over other sections has been consecrated by its heavy centralization.

Cultural values also exert a strong impact upon organizational and managerial behavior within each national bureaucratic system. American management philosophy has been dominated by vitality, mobility, informality, abundance, and quantity. In contrast, caution, wisdom, stability, formalism, necessity, quality have been emphasized by Vietnamese management. Decision-making in America is widely decentralized. There is widespread delegation and group participation. In Vietnam, decision-making tends to be centralized and individualized. American leadership relies heavily on professional expertise and the ability to reconcile the two conflicting ideologies of success and equality. Moral prestige and general intellectual superiority constitute the primary basis of Vietnamese leadership.

Part 2

American Technical Assistance to

South Viet Nam

A review of the literature on public administration technical assistance since 1955 seems to confirm our suggested hypotheses. In the aid projects which are going to be studied, it appears that which was congruent with the Vietnamese value system was readily accepted and implemented successfully. What was incongruent with it was rejected or met with failure, and what attempted to change only the technical system was also welcome and incorporated into Vietnamese administration.

Local Administration Reforms 21

As already suggested, the Vietnamese view of social and administrative order is one in which authority derives from the top. It is thus not hard to understand why the kinds of recommendations by American advisors that aimed at reinforcing this hierarchical order were readily accepted by the Vietnamese government.

In 1956, the recommendation of the Michigan State University Advisory Group (MSUAG) concerning local administration reforms appeared to be dominated by two main familiar considerations in American public administration, effectiveness and responsiveness. In the view of MSUAG, the most serious problems confronting Vietnamese local administration were those which hampered bureaucratic responsiveness, namely, the lack of contact between the central government in Saigon and the rural people, and the absence of democratic participation in regional and provincial administration. Included were those which stood on the way of bureaucratic effectiveness: inefficient division of responsibility, existence of uncoordinated budgets, absence of an adequate control system, unwillingness to delegate power to the lowest echelons.

To bring remedies to these administration deficiencies, MSUAG proposed the following reforms; abolition of regional administration, consolidation of provinces into localities, suppression of regional and provincial budgets, creation of elected locality councils, and of a political control of appointments.

It is interesting to note that most of those proposals which, in the American mind aimed at achieving efficiency, were congruent with the Vietnamese view of administrative order, and were warmly welcomed by the Vietnamese government. On the contrary, those which pertained to administrative responsiveness - creation of elected councils - were refused under some pretext or did not work as expected.

Abolition of the Regions

The suppression of the three regions of Vietnam was advocated by American advisors because regional administration, in their opinion, was an "unuseful level" between the central government and the provinces, slowed down administrative operations and created confusion in the localization of responsibility and overlapping in leadership. This American concern for

efficiency agreed with the Vietnamese concern for hierarchical order. Indeed, the central government, led by President Ngo dinh Diem, had little control over regional administrations which enjoyed an almost unlimited autonomy as a result of the French policy "divide and conquer". President Diem wanted to abolish these strong centers of power led by regional governors who were in a position to challenge him, in order for the authority of his government to reach the entire country. The reform was implemented successfully within a very short period of time.

Election of Locality Councils and Locality Chiefs

The abolition of the regional echelon left 37 provinces reporting directly to the Department of the Interior. The span of control of the latter being too wide, MSUAG proposed the consolidation of provinces into 14 localities, each having an elected locality chief and an elected locality council.

This attempt to transfer this pattern of local democracy for the sake of administrative responsiveness met only with an agreement "in principle". Vietnamese officials promised to implement this reform at a later date when normal security condition was restored. In fact, the grant of home rule never materialized under the Diem government.

After a change of government in 1963, Vietnamese officials fulfilled their promise and encouraged some kind of mitigated local democracy. Provincial councils elected by village councillors were intended to provide a sort of check and guidance to province chiefs appointed by the central government. It was found, however, that:

... Councillors were inclined to take opportunities for obstruction more often than opportunities for

cooperation. The American faith, which these arrangements honoured, in the power of local self-determination to lead back to the paths of righteousness communities subverted by the Viet Cong during the tyranny of Ngo Dinh Diem received little confirmation in practice.²²

Political Control of Nominations

As to the nomination of officials to different posts in the governmental hierarchy, MSUAG recommended a system of direct nomination by which the agent was to be appointed by his direct superior to whom he is responsible. Moreover, the political functions of locality chiefs or province chiefs should be nominated with the consent of elected territorial councils.

These recommendations based on considerations of responsiveness and the so called "principle" of administration according to which authority must be commensurate with responsibility, we discarded sub silentio since they were against Vietnamese culture. It is hard for the Vietnamese superior to accept that his power be checked by his subordinates even though they may be elected councillors.

On the other hand, to leave the matter of appointment up to the direct superior, to give him a free hand to select his subordinates may encourage the centrifugal tendencies. Besides, without a strict hierarchical control, the official may appoint his supporters, friends and relatives to different posts under his direct command. Unlike the American who believes that everyone is eager to improve himself, to attempt to do a better job, and thus tends to delegate his power downward, the Vietnamese assumes that the inherent goodness of man left unchecked would succumb to evil tendencies. All this is found in the Vietnamese culture and escapes the American mind which is primarily concerned with "getting things done".

Besides the reforms in local government, MSUAG assisted also in reorganizing the budget system. A survey by the Group suggested that the budget function be strengthened and vested in the Presidency to permit the President to exercise positive policy leadership and formulation. As already indicated, the American concept of executive budget was proposed by reformers as an instrument of presidential leadership, control and coordination, to counterbalance the excessive trends of bureaucratic fragmentation which hampered administrative effectiveness in America.

When transferred to Vietnam, it was like a duck talking to the water. This time, the American concern for efficiency agreed with the Vietnamese concern for centralization and order in the executive budget. President Diem then asked MSUAG to prepare plans for modernizing the budget system. As a result, the relatively unimportant Budget Directorate, the Directorate of Obligation Control and the Administration of Foreign Aid, all of the Department of Finance were merged into a single agency, the General Directorate of Budget and Foreign Aid attached directly to the Office of the President.

Budget implementation has been greatly improved through a redesigned and improved budget document. A modern system of classifying appropriation accounts based on functional use, has been devised. Mechano-electric accounting has been introduced, permitting up-to-date accounting reports. The procedures of budget execution and control have become more effective thanks to a quarterly allotment and speedier pre-audit of proposed expenditures.

The outcome of the reform was such a tremendous success that a United Nations budget expert pointed out that Vietnam has had the most advanced and up-to-date budget system in this part of the world.

In the writer's opinion, the congruence with local values and the technical aspect of the reform seems to be two decisive factors making for its success. If the new budget system has become so well ingrained in the Vietnamese bureaucracy, it is because it has helped bring uniformity and order to a chaotic situation difficult for the Vietnamese mind to endure. Besides, the innovations touched only the procedural and mechanistic sides of administration. In other words, they changed, according to our hypothesis, only those parts of the lives of the local bureaucrats that are treated technically, and that exist at the highest level of consciousness.

Moreover, the change introduced did not violate any formal or informal norms taken for granted by local people. Nor did it attempt to alter the accepted pattern of authority relationship, status, rank or salary of the public servants. In this respect, the innovation may be considered as culturally neutral. Furthermore, it tended to reinforce the accepted administrative hierarchy by permitting those at the top to exercise leadership, which is quite congruent with the Vietnamese view of order.

On the other hand, the suggested hypothesis is likely to be confirmed in another respect. Among the budgetary reforms, only those pertaining to purely procedural or "technical" matters have been ingrained in Vietnamese administration. But performance budgeting, which emphasizes cost accounting and work measurement, has not been able to take root in it. As a specific product of an equalitarian culture concerned with quantitative measurements and getting things done, performance budgeting hardly fits into the Vietnamese setting in which social hierarchy, moral virtues and other human and intangible considerations tend to prevail over a concern for tangible results from government activities.

These human considerations will be discussed together with the case of Civil Service reform.

Civil Service Reform

If budgetary reforms have brought about results beyond any level of optimistic expectations, MSUAG's consulting activities in the field of personnel administration met with dire failures.

Despite the persistent and tactful effort of highly qualified advisors, the successive attempts at introducing the American position classification system have gotten nowhere up to the present. Every successive Vietnamese Government has tried to refuse to apply the new system under a variety of pretexts.

Like performance budgeting, position classification is a specific product of an equalitarian and achieving culture like America. It is an objective merit system, the focus of which is on the job to be done, and the fitting of an individual into that job. It permits the standardization of the remuneration system on the basis of the value of the work to be done, thus realizing the American principle of "equal pay for equal work."

The slogan of the classification movement in the public sector and the job analysis in the private sector is "the job is the thing." Whoever performs the same job earns the same salary regardless of any other considerations. All this seems to be quite congruent with the American concern for achievement, a doing activity orientation, and a concept of equality already discussed.

In Vietnam, there are many other considerations in addition to work - family, political party, academic degree, loyalty to the boss, moral virtues. According to Civil Service laws and regulations, Vietnamese public servants are paid a salary that would guarantee them a standard of living appropriate to their status and rank in the administrative hierarchy. And in accordance with this principle, family allowances earned by high officials until very recently were significantly higher than those earned by lower rank. All this has a great deal more to do with the man, with his status in the social ladder than with the job to be done.

Besides this emphasis on the person, the confusion between politics and administration appears to be the greatest obstacle to the adoption of the American system. Because neither monarchy (tradition) nor democracy (legality-rationality) can provide a source of legitimacy for bureaucratic power in a "primatic" society like Vietnam, the Vietnamese public administration system has become a "bureaucratic polity" in which political forces compete for power. In such an atmosphere, personal confidence must override administrative and technical competence. Experience has, indeed, conformed that any government which attempted to pursue administrative competence at the expense of political stability did not last more than six months. Such was the fate of the Cabinet of Premier Tho, an administrator, and of Premier Huong, a devoted patriot under the Khanh regime.

In this political environment, the anticipated consequence of position classification would be the strengthening of bureaucratic effectiveness in dealing with economic and social problems. Yet its unanticipated consequence is likely to be political instability and eventually the overthrow of those in power.

On the other hand, the on-going rank system might give room to corruption, nepotism, arbitrariness. Yet its latent functions appear to be many. Its very defects - lack of uniformity, imprecision - can give it much more flexibility than the American system. It gives room for those in power to achieve political stability by dealing with situations and individuals separately. It allows the regime to utilize talents without offending those who are cut loose from their job.

All these considerations make it unlikely for the Vietnamese leadership to adopt a rigid system which would be a burden to the regime. It may endanger the very survival of the government if implemented faithfully, or result in greater confusion or "formalism" if applied in principle but disregarded in practice.

In the field of police reform, MSUAG's efforts also appeared to succeed mostly where they touched only the technical part of local police administration. Indeed, as reported by MSUAG, assistance to Vietnamese police agencies was generally successful in the field of material aid and its training and consulting activities also brought about good results insofar as they were related to material aid.

Material assistance

With an important and some minor exceptions, the program of material aid to the three local police agencies - national surete, municipal police, and civil guard - was generally successful according to MSUAG. The minor exceptions had to do with the sophistication of some radio equipment and to the fact that the Vietnamese government clearly favored the surete over the municipal police in violation of aid project agreement. This seems easy to understand since a "bureaucratic polity", the national surete which is more involved in politics must prevail over the municipal police, whose role is mostly of a non-political character.

The major weakness of the program resulted from the differences between Vietnamese and MSUAG over the direction of development the Civil Guard should take. The disagreement appeared to bring into focus the differences in value between Americans and Vietnamese. While agreeing on the basic objective - internal security - they differed in the means to achieve it. Americans put more emphasis on "democratic" means to maintain security, whereas Vietnamese gave more weight to the authority of government. While Americans believed that the Guard would become more effective if the role of the specialist, its director general, was strengthened, the Vietnamese tended to put more faith on the generalist - province chief. If Americans were persuaded that the efficiency

of the Guard would be increased by the elimination of its bad elements, Vietnamese were rather convinced that such a purge for the sake of technical efficiency would create social discord and do harm to the cause of internal security.

Political centralization through thirty-six weak province chiefs was deemed more functional to political stability and appeared to be more congruent with the Vietnamese cautious character and conception of social order than technical centralization through one strong man who might constitute a potential challenge to presidential power.

The result of the disagreement was a four year impasse (1955-1959) during which practically none of the equipment was delivered to the Civil Guard.

In short, the case of the Guard being excepted, the material aid program was brought to successful completion since it pertained only to technical matters and did not violate any formal and informal systems in local police administration. The same analysis applies also to police training.

Training

MSUAG found that training activities appeared to be most successful where they are concerned with the use and maintenance of materials, that is with technical learning.

As already suggested, formal and informal behavior is transmitted mainly at the level of unconsciousness. One learns it simply by living in a culture. Technical learning, in contrast, occurs at the highest level of consciousness. It is usually transmitted from teacher to student in explicit terms. Unlike informal learning, it depends more on the intelligence with which the material is analyzed and presented and on the aptitude of the trainee to follow instructions than on his other abilities or on the selection of adequate models.

Thus MSUAG's training in the use of firearms and other equipment was very successful but its introduction of American legal norms and evidence gathering methods resisted and did not produce any effect upon the trainees. Our hypothesis seems to be confirmed again this time since the former was technical learning whereas the latter belong to the realm of formal and informal behavior, which can hardly be learned that way.

Consulting

It was also reported by MSUAG that consulting activities were, in general, most successful in technical areas and where they were connected with material aid. The successful areas included the conversion of the antiquated Poettecher and Parisian finger-print system into the modern Henry system, the introduction of a plastic identity card, the centralization and unification of police records, the improvement of the functioning of the crime detection laboratory, and of traffic police.

In contrast to these brilliant results in the technical areas, MSUAG's attempts to change the formal and informal system of local police administration failed almost completely.

The University Group wanted the Vietnamese Government to specify the legal authority of each of the three police and security services, to eliminate overlapping jurisdiction among them, to delegate adequate authority to and within them, to give them jurisdiction over civil offenses committed by military personnel, and to curtail political interference in their internal administration and law-enforcement operation. These recommendations were no closer to adoption in 1962 than they were first presented in 1957.

MSUG also sought to loosen the control of the province chiefs over the surete and especially over the civil guard but without success; it felt that the province chiefs seriously interfered with the operations of these national agencies.²⁵

Organization and Methods²⁶

Provided MSUAG confined itself to reform that did not run counter to the formal and informal system and change only the technical system, its recommendations in the field of O&M, as elsewhere, were readily accepted and successfully implemented. With its technical assistance, the Department of Health installed a mechanical system of inventory control of drugs, improved its warehousing procedures and records management. The methods of storage, inventory and distribution of medical supplies were later used as models for other agencies. MSUAG's most outstanding achievement in O&M was the design of a Vietnamese standardized typewriter to replace hundreds of varieties of typewriter keyboards used in Vietnam. It was adopted by the government which decreed that after 1963 all imported typewriters would have to conform to its model.

The above mentioned successes and the like in the technical areas were considered as minor ones by MSUAG who questioned whether they were worth the time and effort. However, when their recommendations touched the sensitive political nerves of the bureaucratic system - control of administrative programs, better departmental organization, improvement of government wide management, guidance for inter-departmental relationship - they were overlooked or forgotten.

Public Administration Training²⁷

It has been observed by Weidner that in several countries,

training activities in public administration are much more acceptable than any other kinds of aid programs since they "can more easily be ignored."²⁸ This remark is generally true if the nature of training is compared with other activities, but within the field of training itself, it appears that only the features that are congruent with local culture or confine themselves within the technical areas can be accepted and successfully implemented. The following study of the introduction of pre-service and in-service training in Vietnam apparently confirms this statement.

In-Service Training

Recommendations by MSUAG to establish a government-wide training program for all Vietnamese civil servants, at high as well as low levels, met with failure because the inter-departmental Council on In-Service Training set up in 1956 to this effect, failed to become an effective instrument - Moreover, the draft of a presidential order establishing such a program was not signed by the President.

MSUAG attributed to failure mainly to the lack of a qualified training staff and agencies, and the unwillingness of higher level officials to submit themselves to training.

In this writer's opinion, the lack of material and technical means did not appear to be as important as the lack of will. Had powerful officials wanted to improve their administrative competence, means could have been found one way or another, especially with the anxious support of foreign aid. But they seemed to be more interested in playing their game of personal politics than in increasing their technical capacity, since the former paid off much more than the latter in a bureaucratic polity. If they were more competent in politics than in administration, to subject them to administrative training was to force them to reveal their ignorance in this field, which would mean a loss of face, of prestige, and perhaps of positions. This inarticulated fear appeared to have a lot to do with the failure of the program.

When MSUAG shifted its strategy and pursued a limited training program for non-political and lower officials, the results were more satisfactory. Yet the program, in MSUAG's opinion, can only be judged as "relatively successful" because the new training techniques - conferences, case method, role playing caused uneasiness among local trainers and trainees which led to indifferences, opposition or only passive support from key government agencies.

In our opinion, the love of education which has been a traditional feature of Vietnamese culture apparently made for the partial success of the training program. Yet some aspects of the latter did not seem to give him a strong motivation to learn.

The features that run counter to the Vietnamese value system appeared to have to do with the assumption about the relationship between teacher and student and among students. The high status and prestige enjoyed by the teacher in a Confucian culture like Vietnam is only second to the sovereign according to the trilogy - king, teacher, father. Thus, in order to be a teacher, one must be a very respectable and correct person and surpass by far the student in the subject matter being taught. It is only when these conditions are fulfilled that the instructor feels confident to teach and the trainee to learn. Moreover, trainees who attend the same course should possess roughly equivalent educational achievements or rank to avoid loss of face in case high level people should be overtaken or equalled by lower ones. These fears originating in the unconscious tendency to think in hierarchical terms, in the already mentioned "status consciousness" appeared to be the deep causes of the lack of motivation.

This assumption about the relationship between trainer and trainee combined with the Vietnamese cautious character and hence the tendency to "talk only when asked to and "when

one knows for sure" also explains why the "democratic" techniques of learning, products of an equalitarian society created uneasiness and indifference. The case method, conference, role playing, seminar suppose a lot of talking by trainees, a certain equality between instructor and trainee, and group cooperation among class members. The American who believes that he is "as good as the next man" tends to consider his classmate's ideas as worth paying attention to as anyone else's, including that of teachers and text book writers, and is motivated to listen to, and participate in group discussion.

The Vietnamese who believes that "you can never do any good without the teacher" is inclined to consider his own and equal's opinion as of little value and discussion among "equal heads" as a waste of time. While the American is an independent learner and a team man, the Vietnamese is a dependent learner and an individual occupying a definite status in the hierarchy.

Thus when the seminar approach is used at some schools, it is no longer the give-and-take typical of the American seminar, but is so structured that it rather becomes a means for the instructor to check whether students have learned their lessons. There is very little discussion since the student cannot disagree with or "correct" his instructor without making the latter lose face; the instructor cannot admit his ignorance on some point without seeing his authority or prestige undermined, and the ideas of classmates are trivial.

National Institute of Administration

MSUAG's assistance to the NIA, an organization entrusted with the recruitment and training of high administrative officials has brought about roughly the same results as in other fields of training.

The transfer of the managerial and social science approach to public administration has taken hold in the Institute since the changes have not violated any sensitive ground and have occurred at the highest level of consciousness, under the rational control of local instructors and students. In other words, the innovations pertain to the "technical" area. But this does not appear to be the case with the transfer of new methods of research and teaching. MSUAG has observed, for instance - that the lecture method still remains the predominant one.

The emphasis on lectures and the lack of use of the seminar approach have already been discussed. Let us speculate here a little about the reasons why the case study approach has subsided after American advisors left. This method made some headway when MSUAG was in Vietnam with the NIA Case Development Seminar culminating in the publication of the Cases in Vietnamese Administration, under the guidance of Prof. Montgomery. This work required a great deal of cooperation among different government agencies and academic circles. It was Montgomery who served as coordinator to bring the work to successful completion. The book was the result of the cooperative effort of a big team guided by an American Captain. After this Captain left, no such work could be accomplished since the cooperative spirit among equal anonymous others is lacking in Vietnamese culture. This kind of cooperative work could be done in Vietnam through a hierarchical system, and this is difficult to realize in an academic circle and among parallel agencies.

This difference between the American and Vietnamese character may also explain why there has been no more collective field research studies after the departure of the Michiganders. Vietnamese faculty members produced only individual works.

Conclusion

In short, it has been found that those American administrative

features that serve the cause of efficiency through central coordination and leadership have been transplanted successfully in Vietnam as was the case with the executive budget and the suppression of regional administration, because these contribute to the strengthening of local values.

Administrative innovations that did not violate any part of the formal and informal behavioral systems, and confined themselves to changes in the technical sphere of local life have also been accepted and implemented with success, as shown by the cases of procedural reforms in O&M, of the use and maintenance of materials, and of the institutionalization of public administration training.

In contrast, those transferred items which run counter to the prevailing local values, such as local democracy, decentralization, position-classification, performance budgeting, participative learning and team research have been rejected either at the outset or through gradual disappearance.

This is so because each social system has its own internal logic which has taken shape through generations of socialization, making it impossible for it to incorporate extraneous elements which may disrupt the whole system and endanger its survival. Therefore, the introduction of change should take into account this logic in order for the innovations to fit into the whole.

The cases of reform seems to shed some light on the controversy over the "incrementalist" and "wholistic" approach to change, by demonstrating that neither one is necessarily doomed to failure or automatically leads to success. The abolitions of the regions, which were like three states in the federation, and their incorporation into the national government, the introduction of mechanical accounting into the entire national budget were large-scale sweeping reforms with far reaching consequences upsetting the whole existing administrative order. Yet these wholistic changes fared

admirably well, while the piece-meal introduction of local democracy or "democratic" training techniques led nowhere. On the other hand, incremental changes like the standardization of the typewriter brought about brilliant success while large-scale reforms such as the government-wide training program failed miserably.

These cases seem to demonstrate that the issue does not lie in incrementalism or wholism but rather in the goodness of fit between the introduced innovations and the whole system. Provided the part can fit into the whole, no matter how large or small it may be, the change is likely to succeed. In this light, it appears that the "mixed-scanning" approach, which reconciles both incrementalism and wholism, may provide an answer to the controversy.

Another conclusion that may derive from this study is that, given the decisive role of the unconscious values in a culture, it would be useless to expect the recipient country to reflect the image of the donor nation in its road to development. Whether a country has developed or not must be judged by the extent to which it can adapt and survive within the world supersystem but not by the disparate applications of certain features of a mirror country.

In final analysis, we may conclude that our suggested hypothesis is conformed. There is no all general formula for the cross-cultural transfer of administrative features. Instead, each case is dependent upon a study of its relationship to the value system of both the giving and accepting culture.

N O T E S


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MINISTRY OF STATE (WITHOUT PORTFOLIO)


Decree No. 102-SL/Th.T/QTCS of 12 September 1969



- 85 -


MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

(Decree No. 85-SL/NG of July 14, 1970, as amended by Decree No. 90-SL/NG of July 30, 1970)




MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR

Decree No. 84-SL/NV of July 13, 1968, as amended to date




MINISTRY OF INFORMATION

(Decree No. 39-SL/TT of April 14, 1970)



MINISTRY OF ETHNIC DEVELOPMENT


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
- 68 -

MINISTRY OF OPEN ARMS

(Decree No. 098-SL/CH of August 26, 1970)



MINISTRY OF LAND REFORM, AGRICULTURE AND FISHERY DEVELOPMENT




Decree # 65 - SL/CCDD/CN dated June 25, 1968

ADPA- November 1970

NATIONAL DEFENSE AND ARMED FORCES OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

(DECREE NO. 64 - A - TT / SL OF JULY 1, 1970)



(A) JOINT GENERAL STAFF IS CONCURRENTLY
ARMY COMMAND

(B) INCLUDING REGIONAL AND POPULAR
FORCES UNITS.